Mit - Index

Mit - UVK_Sinfo_2008_06_št.11 - Index

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marked its semester at the EU helm: from the independence of
Kosovo to the emergence of the energy issue, from the mounting
inflationary pressures in the Eurozone to the Irish referendum on
the Lisbon Treaty.
Seen in this light, Slovenia’s Presidency can be seen as a qualified
success, considering also the limited diplomatic resources of the
country and its short experience of EU affairs. On Kosovo, its
knowledge of the region helped forging a few useful compromises
(on EULEX and the SAA with Serbia), thanks also to the support of
a few like minded partners. On energy, the Commission took the
lead in the run up to the March European Council, and Slovenia's
lack of specific interests in this domain made things easier. A
similar pattern emerged in the finalisation of the mandate for
negotiating the new PCA with Russia, while the Irish referendum
first conditioned the EU internal debate and also the legislative
process for months, then took everyone by surprise with its
outcome and spoiled the June European Council. For Slovenia,
on the whole, a respectable and almost flawless performance
with a bitter Irish aftertaste, although the consequences will be
borne mainly by the French Presidency.
In this respect, even the next EU summit in October may not
be conclusive, and a final decision over Lisbon is more likely to
be taken in mid-December, at the end of the French semester.
By then, especially if all other EU parliaments have completed
ratification, it may be easier also for Ireland to come up with
some solution to the riddle that its ‘No’ has created.
At this stage, there seems to be no legal alternative to a second
referendum, although the precise terms on which it could be
carried out are still difficult to imagine: a simple re-run appears
questionable, given the turnout (above 50 %) and the amount
of ‘Noes’ (above 53 %) on 12 June. In 2001, both had been
much lower, thus leaving political room for asking a second
sinfo 11 10
opinion after the Seville European Council released a reassuring
Declaration on Ireland’s neutrality. This time around, it appears
more difficult to identify a single policy issue to address in
order to pave the way for a popular ‘Yes’ to Lisbon - although
specific reassurances could be offered, once again, on neutrality
(perhaps with a solution along the Danish model, whereby e.g.
Ireland could pre-emptively pull out of the European Defence
Agency) and/or keeping one Commissioner per Member State
(the concern for losing its ‘own’ Commissioner from 2014 played
a role in the ‘No’ vote), which is a rising demand also among
virtually all the other EU countries. The political room for calling
a second referendum may therefore lie in some interpretation of
the ‘No’ coupled with a set of ad hoc assurances that would not
impinge on the substance of Lisbon.
Other options that have been floated in various quarters in the
immediate aftermath of the Irish ‘No’ - all including the possibility
of proceeding with Lisbon at 26 (or less) - look either legally
shaky or politically unfeasible. In turn, scenarios envisaging a
two- or multi-speed EU led by ‘pioneer groups’ appear like either
pipe dreams or paper tigers - or both. Pipe dreams, because of
the intricate and intimate tangle of legal obligations that bind
the Member States together, which renders such diffrentiation
‘by design’ hardly feasible, And paper tigers because of the
visible absence of such a driving group of like-minded (and selfappointed)
‘pioneers’, and also because - to date - such plans
have been conceived and used (if ever) more to deter obstructive
Member States than to launch new ambitious policies. At the
same time, a degree of differentiation does exist already within
the EU, and it is likely to increase in the future, and not only
for Ireland, due also to the increasing disomogeneity among
the Member States - but, yet again, rather ‘by default’, namely
following voluntary and negotiated exemptions from agreed
policies.
The Irish vote has not shut down the EU institutions. The Union
continues to do business, to legislate and to act − although it will
have to wait a bit longer to understand what direction it can take
from 2009. But the Irish vote has displayed a structural difficulty
of today’s Union, namely its inability to agree on reforms and
stick to them, thus turning Lisbon also into a test of internal and
external credibility for all. And it has also highlighted once again
a fundamental problem the EU is suffering from: while policies
must increasingly be adopted and carried out above the national
level to be effective, politics still operates at the national (or even
sub-national) level − thus creating recurrent short-circuits and
negative feedback effects.
If some pragmatic solution is eventually found to ‘fix’ Lisbon, it
will then probably be even more necessary to try and involve
the citizens in both EU policies and politics, starting with the
forthcoming elections for the European Parliament. An option
could lie in giving the voters of all 27 Member States the possibility
of choosing the next President of the Commission through a
transparent if informal procedure, whereby the main Euro-parties
would ‘nominate’ their respective candidates for the job: these
would have to run a EU-wide campaign with a single political
programme, and the winner would eventually get elected by the
new European Parliament.
It is a solution that also has potential drawbacks - including the
explicit policisation of a body that has crucial regulatory functions
- but at least it would give some meaning to the June 2009
vote and mobilise citizens for rather than just against Europe.
Otherwise, anti-EU populism is likely to take root all over the
Union and seriously affect the functioning of institutions and
policies − with unpredictable consequences.
Commentary EPC